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ABSTRACTS OF REOWN CASES
Carolyn Jaffe Andrew*
Abstractor
Admissions-People v. Underwood,37 Cal. Rptr.
313 (1964). Defendant was convicted of rape,
robbery, and kidnapping. On appeal, defendant
contended that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of extra-judicial statements made by
defendant and one Wisdom (originally a co-defendant but not tried with defendant), since the
statements resulted from police coercion. The
Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that
since involuntary confessions cannot be used to impeach the testimony of an accused, and in light of
the rule that a defendant's involuntary admissions
are inadmissible as affirmative evidence, defendant's involuntary admission, which was the product
of uncontradicted police threats and coercion,
should not have been used to impeach his credibility; that the same policy considerations [i.e.,
lack of trustworthiness, community interest in fair
play, desire that police be deterred from breaking
the law when enforcing the law] which precluded
the use as impeachment evidence of defendant's
involuntary admission required that the prosecution also be precluded from impeaching Wisdom by
the use of his involuntary statements, also the
product of uncontradicted police coercion; and that
since the cumulative effect of erroneously allowing
defendant's and Wisdom's involuntary extrajudicial admissions to be used to impeach their respective testimony was prejudicial to defendant,
his conviction must be reversed.
Admissions-Hall v. State, 196 A.2d 874 (Md.
1964). See Derivative Evidence, infra.
Alibi-State v. Searies, 197 A.2d 384 (N.J. Super.,
App. Div. 1964). Defendant was convicted of
robbery. On appeal, defendant contended that the
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the
issue of alibi even though defendant failed to request an alibi instruction or to object to the court's
failure to charge as to alibi. Noting that the question was one of first impression in New Jersey, the
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
reversed and remanded, holding that since alibi
* LL.B., LL.M., Northwestern University School of
Law. Member Illinois Bar.

was defendant's sole defense and was raised by the
evidence, the trial court's failure to instruct the
jury sua sponte concerning the evidential effect of
the claimed alibi in creating a reasonable doubt
constituted plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights and requiring reversal.
Appeal by Defendant-State v. Mooneyham, 390
P.2d 215 (Kan. 1964). Defendant was convicted of
grand larceny of an automobile, and he appealed.
The Supreme Court of Kansas dismissed the appeal, holding that a defendant's statutory right of
appeal [Kw. GEN. STAT. §62-1701] may be waived
by acquiescence in the judgment; and that defendant's unsuccessful application to the trial court for
parole, after judgment and sentence were pronounced and while represented by counsel, constituted recognition of the validity of the judgment,
waiver of any alleged trial errors, and acquiescence
in the judgment, which operated to waive defendant's statutory right of appeal.
Appeal by the State--In re Fitts, 197 A.2d 808
(Vt. 1964). See Habeas Corpus, infra.
Arrest-Hall v. State, 196 A.2d 874 (Md. 1964).
See Derivative Evidence, infra.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Preston v. United
States, 84 Sup. Ct. 881 (1964). Petitioners were convicted of conspiracy to rob a federally insured bank,
and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. On certiorari, petitioners contended that
evidence seized by Kentucky police officers in
violation of their constitutional rights was admitted
in evidence over their objection. In a unanimous
opinion written by Mr. Justice Black, the United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
holding that the rule allowing searches to be made
without warrants incident to lawful arrests is justified "by the need to seize weapons and other things
which might be used to assault an officer or effect
an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the
destruction of evidence of the crime"; that, even
assuming that the Kentucky police lawfully arrested petitioners on a charge of vagrancy, the
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ing and concealing marijuana. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress marijuana, since it was
obtained as the result of an unlawful search and
seizure. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that where United States Customs officers, who had information (not amounting
to probable cause) that defendant was engaged in
narcotics activities, went to his home to question
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Burke v. United him without intention to arrest defendant or to
search the premises, and upon knocking on the door
States, 328 F.2d 399 (ist Cir. 1964). Defendant
brothers John and Leo Burke were convicted of were admitted by defendant's 8-year-old daughter,
the officers were lawfully on the premises, since
mail robbery and conspiracy to rob the mails. On
their purpose in seeking admittance-i.e., merely
appeal, defendants contended that the trial court
to talk with defendant-was lawful, and, in the
erred in denying their motions to suppress illegally
seized evidence. The Court of Appeals for the First absence of evidence that the daughter was not
Circuit affirmed, holding that although examina- authorized to open the door to let people in, her
tion on Dec.,27, 1962, of John's room in his absence letting the officers in constituted valid consent to
by Boston police officers with consent of the land- the officers to enter the home; that "once legally
inside the room, the officers were not required to
lady constituted an illegal search, a letter-carrier's
uniform observed but not seized during that search remain blind to the obvious," and consequently,
was not suppressible as a fruit of the illegal search, their observations, while waiting for defendant, of
inasmuch as federal postal inspectors knew prior to marijuana in plain view in two wastebaskets did
the search that John had recently acquired a letter- not constitute a search; that the officers' prior information concerning defendant's narcotics dealcarrier's uniform, and knowledge of information
gained from an independent source does not become ings together with their lawfully acquired personal
unusable merely because the same information is knowledge that there was marijuana in defendant's
subsequently discovered during an illegal search; 'home constituted sufficient grounds for a reasonthat although Leo was illegally arrested by Boston able belief that defendant was committing the
police officers, a $20 bill obtained from him by offense of possessing marijuana in their presence,
federal postal inspectors during subsequent de- and thus the officers' arrest without a warrant of
tention at the Boston City Jail was properly ad- defendant in his upstairs bedroom immediately folmitted in evidence, since the district court's find- lowing their observation of the marijuana downing-that Leo's surrender of the money was made stairs was lawful; that the search of defendant's
voluntarily on the basis of an intervening inde- bedroom, which yielded more marijuana, was lawpendent act of free will, rather than under com- ful as incident to defendant's lawful arrest; and
pulsion of the illegal arrest-could not be said to be consequently, the marijuana observed in the wasteerroneous, and because even if Leo was not ar- baskets and discovered during the search of defendraigned without unnecessary delay, he was a state ant's bedroom was lawfully seized, and the district
prisoner booked on state charges, and the local court properly denied defendant's motion to
police's action of informing the postal inspectors of suppress.
Leo's arrest and the inspectors' questioning of Leo
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Shelton,
did not make him a federal prisoner so as to bring
him under the protection of FED. R. CRwb. P. 5(a);
36 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1964). Defendants were conthat the search of John's room on Jan. 4, 1963, was' victed of possessing heroin. On appeal, defendants
conducted with his uncoerced consent; and conse- contended that the trial court erred in overruling
quently, the district court properly refused to sup- their objection to the introduction into evidence of
press the evidence complained of.
a hypodermic needle and heroin on the ground that
they were obtained in the course of an unlawful
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Davis v. United search of their apartment. The Supreme Court of
States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964). Defendant
California reversed, holding that since the search
was convicted in a federal district court for receiv- was made without a warrant, the prosecution bore
search of the glove compartment and trunk of
petitioners' car without a warrant was not lawful as
"incident to arrest," since the search was conducted after petitioners were in custody at a police
station and while the car was in a garage, at a time
and place where the reasons for the rule justifying
warrantless searches incident to lawful arrests did
not exist.
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the burden of showing proper justification; that the
search could not be justified as incident to one defendant's arrest, since it occurred some two miles
from the premises searched; that prior to searching
the apartment the officers lacked probable cause to
arrest defendant occupants, so the search could not
be justified as incident to their arrests; that the
search could not be justified on the ground that defendant Shelton consented thereto, since Shelton's
response, "All right, go ahead," to an officer's
suggestion that they go to the apartment and
"take a look" did not constitute voluntary consent
to search, particularly in light of the facts that
Shelton was then under arrest and subsequently
refused to assist the officers in gaining access to the
apartment; but even if Shelton's statement constituted voluntary consent, his consent could not
operate to justify the officers' invasion of the
privacy of defendant Victorian, Shelton's joint
occupant in the premises, when they demanded
entry without justification; that Victorian's opening of the door upon the officers' unauthorized
demand at a time when they lacked probable cause
to arrest her could not be relied on to justify her
arrest, effected upon seeing contraband in open
view, or the search of the apartment incident
thereto; and consequently, the search complained
of was conducted in violation of defendants' constitutional rights, and the evidence so obtained
should have been suppressed.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Peoplev. Frank, 37
Cal. Rptr. 202 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defendant
was convicted in a bench trial of possession of
marijuana. On appeal from the judgment granting
probation, defendant contended that the marijuana
was obtained as the result of conduct which constituted an unlawful search and seizure. The California District Court of Appeal reversed, holding
that since prior to the search of defendant's room
without a warrant the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him for possession of marijuana,
the admissibility of the marijuana depended
upon whether effective consent was given to the
search of defendant's room; that the trial court
erred in finding thatdefendant's landlady's consent
to the search, given while defendant was present,
was effective to validate the search, inasmuch as
defendant's constitutionally protected right of
privacy was not so under the landlady's control
that he could not personally assert it under the
circumstances; and since by erroneously relying on
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the landlady's consent to validate the search the
trial court failed to determine the crucial issue
(upon which the evidence was in substantial conffict) whether defendant himself consented, the
judgment must be reversed.
Arrest, Search and Seizure--People v. Martin, 36
Cal. Rptr. 924 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defendant
was convicted of possession of narcotics and sentenced as a multiple offender. On appeal, defendant
contended that the trial court erred in receiving
evidence obtained in a search incident to his illegal
arrest. The California District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that where police officers of the City
of Los Angeles arrested defendant in the City of
Alhambra, beyond the geographical limits of their
authority as police officers, the arrest must be
viewed as having been made by private citizens;
that since no offense was committed by defendant
in the officers' presence, they had no power lawfully to effect a citizen's arrest, since such an arrest
is valid only if an offense is actually committed in
the arresting citizen's presence; that the search
incident to defendant's arrest was illegal and the
evidence suppressible, inasmuch as the arrest was
illegal; that defendant's purported consent could
not be relied upon to justify the search, since "consent given in submission to an express or implied
assertion of authority cannot be said to be free and
voluntary"; and even though as a general rule evidence obtained in an unreasonable search and seizure by a private citizen is admissible, since the
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures operate only against the government, that
rule could not be invoked where the citizens were
acting in the performance of their duties, albeit
outside the technical scope of their authority, as
police officers and as agents of the state.
[This case is unusual in that the officers are
treated as private individuals for the purpose of
determining whether the arrest, search and seizure
were valid, but as government agents for the purpose of applying the exclusionary rule.]
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Regalado,
36 Cal. Rptr. 795 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defendant
was convicted of possession of heroin, the California District Court of Appeal affirmed, and the
California Supreme Court denied hearing. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and remanded the case for further consideration in
light of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, abstracted
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L., C. & P.S. 488 (1963), and

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). On
remand, defendant contended that the methods
used by the police officers in the apprehension and
arrest of defendant and in seizing the contraband
violated his constitutional rights, and that the evidence so obtained should have been suppressed.
The California District Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that where the arresting officers observed
defendant and others through a tiny hole bored in
the door of a hotel room, the ensuing arrest of defendant and seizure of narcotics and narcotics
paraphernalia were illegal, since the officers' only
knowledge or information of defendant's unlawful
activity was gained illegally by means of an exploratory and unlawful search conducted by use of
the peephole, which, although it had not been
bored by the arresting officers, had probably been
bored by police; and consequently, the evidence
complained of should not have been admitted
against defendant. The court noted that the
officers' wrongful conduct in using the peephole
would compel the same result even in absence of
evidence of police practices involving the boring of
peepholes, and that prior opinions of the court inconsistent with this case had been overruled, on
the issue of whether information obtained in such a
manner is lawfully obtained, by the Supreme Court
of California in Bidicki v. SuperiorCourt, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 552 (1962), abstracted at 54 J. Cim. L.,
C. & P.S. 81 (1963).
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v.Stafford,37
Cal. Rptr. 578 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defendant,
charged with possessing marijuana for sale, was
convicted of the lesser included offense of possession of marijuana. On appeal, defendant contended
that the marijuana admitted in evidence was the
product of an unlawful search and seizure, and that
his testimony admitting possession was a product
of the erroneous admission of this evidence. The
California District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that, even assuming that the search complained
of was unlawful for lack of probable cause for defendant's arrest to which the search without warrant was incident, defendant was not prejudiced by
admission of the evidence, inasmuch as his own
testimony, designed to denypossession for purposes
of sale, flatly admitted possession; that assuming
the admission of the marijuana in evidence was
erroneous, defendant's testimony, if "impelled" by
the error, could not be segregated from it to sustain

the judgment; but since defendant was represented
by counsel and voluntarily took the stand, his
testimony was not impelled by judicial error and
constituted evidence independent of the search to
sustain the judgment. The court noted, "[E]rror, if
any, in that search does not immunize defendant
from conviction upon other evidence."
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Benefield v. State,
160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964). Petitioner was convicted of attempted grand larceny, and the District
Court of Appeal affirmed. On certiorari, petitioner
contended that evidence resulting from an unlawful search was admitted against him. The Supreme
Court of Florida quashed the decision of the
District Court of Appeal and remanded for further
consideration not inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's decision, holding that since the search complained of was conducted without a warrant, the
evidence seized, to be admissible, must be the
product of a search incident to a lawful arrest; but
even assuming that the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest petitioner without a warrant,
the lawfulness of the arrest was vitiated by the
officers' unlawful manner of entry into petitioner's
home when they entered in total violation of the
provisions of FLA. STAT. ANN. §901.19(1), which requires that an officer announce his authority and
purpose and be refused admittance before breaking
into a building to effect an arrest; and consequently, since the arrest was rendered unlawful by
the officers' method of entry, the search conducted
incident thereto was also unlawful, and the resulting evidence was therefore inadmissible.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Stae v. Freeland,125
N.W.2d 825 (Iowa 1964). See Scientific Evidence-Polygraph Tests, infra.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-State v. Pickens, 160
So. 2d 577 (La. 1964). Defendants were convicted
of simple burglary. On appeal, defendants contended that the trial court erred in refusing to
grant their motions to suppress illegally seized evidence and in overruling their motion for new trial
on the same ground. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana affirmed, holding that where police
officers investigating a very recent burglary noticed
defendants, whom they did not recognize as "local
boys," driving a car 3 to 5 mph in an alley behind
the burglarized premises, and upon hailing defendants' car to a halt noticed a box on the front
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seat which one defendant, in answer to an officer's
question, said contained "nothing," the officers had
probable cause to believe that defendants had
committed the burglary under investigation and
thus probable cause to arrest defendants without a
warrant; that the search of defendants' car, which
yielded merchandise taken during the burglary, was
lawful as incidental to the arrest; and consequently,
the trial court properly received in evidence the
goods complained of, since they were seized as the
result of a lawful search. [The arresting officer's
testimony shows, however, that no arrest was
effected until after search of the box and car revealed stolen property.]
Arrest, Search and Seizure--Commonwealth v.
Lehan, 196 N.E.2d 840 (Mass. 1964). Defendant
was convicted of breaking and entering with intent
to steal and of possessing burglarious implements.
On appeal, defendant contended that the trial
court erroneously denied his motions to suppress
illegally seized evidence. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts reversed and remanded,
holding that although police officers lawfully detained and questioned defendant upon having
"reason to suspect" him of "unlawful design" [by
authority of MASs. GEN. LAws ch. 41, §98] where
the detention did not amount to arrest and was
based on less than the probable cause required to
arrest, their search of boxes in defendant's possession, without warrant and without defendant's
consent, was unreasonable, inasmuch as it was not
incident to a valid arrest and because the officers
were searching for evidence of crime rather than
for weapons to protect themselves while lawfully
detaining defendant; and consequently, defendant's motions to suppress should have been granted.
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holding that Santiago's arrest without warrant,
based on information which had been checked for
reliability, from an informer who had never previously given information which proved to be true,
was lawful, since the checked-out information constituted reasonable cause to believe that defendant
had committed a felony, and consequently, the
search and seizure complained of, conducted incident to the lawful arrest, was also lawful; but that
defendant Martin's arrest without a warrant, based
on untested information from a person whose reliability was not otherwise confirmed, was illegal for
lack of probable cause, and consequently the search
conducted incident to the arrest was unreasonable,
and evidence so obtained should have been suppressed. The court noted that the search of defendant Martin's apartment was also illegal for the
additional reason that, in absence of any emergency
or similar condition justifying forceful intrusion,
the officers forced open a skylight to gain entry.

Bail-United States v. D'Argento, 227 F. Supp.
596 (N.D. Ill. 1964). Applicant Maryland National
Insurance Co., surety on defendant's $50,000 appearance bond, moved for an order vacating or
setting aside a declaration of forfeiture and/or for
remission of a judgment of forfeiture. The United
States moved for entry of judgment on the declaration of forfeiture. The declaration of forfeiture of
the entire bond had been entered following defendants temporary departure from the Northern
District of Illinois without the district court's permission, in violation of a condition of the appearance bond. The District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois entered judgment of $50,000
against applicant but granted applicant's motion
for remission of the judgment to the extent of
$40,000, holding that FF_. R. Camr. P. 46(f) gives
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Santiago, the court discretion to remit all or part of the judgPeople v. Martin,196 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y. 1964). De- ment of forfeiture; and although defendant's
fendants in unrelated cases were convicted of breach of the condition of his bond may not have
felonious possession of a narcotic drug with intent been willful and the Government was caused no
to sell. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the expense because of the breach, $10,000 of the
Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. On $50,000 forfeited would not be remitted, inasmuch
separate appeals, each defendant contended that as applicant had done nothing (such as inform deillegally seized evidence was admitted at the trial. fendant of the conditions of the bond) to prevent
Noting that the appeals were argued on the same the breach. The court noted that a new appearance
bond form had been used, and that the condition
day and that for purposes of contrast the court
found it useful to deal with them in a single opinion, breached by defendant had not appeared in previthe New York Court of Appeals affirmed defend- ous forms of similar bonds.
ant Santiago's conviction and reversed and dismissed the indictment as to defendant Martin,
Bail-United States v. Piper, 227 F. Supp. 735
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(N.D. Tex. 1964). Defendant was convicted of a
federal excise tax offense and applied for release on
bail pending appeal. The District Couxt for the
Northern District of Texas set bail at $75,000,
holding that although the appeal was very likely
frivolous and taken for delay, FED. R. CuM. P. 46
(governing the granting of bail) is to be liberally
construed, and all doubts must be resolved in defendant's favor; and consequently, in the exercise
of its discretion, the court would permit defendant
to be at large pending appeal and would set bail in
the amount of $75,000, which amount the court
thought was reasonable and necessary to assure defendant's presence. The court enumerated various
factors to be considered regarding whether or not
bail should be granted and what amount is reasonable and necessary, citing numerous pertinent
federal cases.
Confessions-Bailey v. United States, 328 F.2d
542 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Defendant was convicted of
manslaughter. On appeal, defendant contended
that a typed confession obtained during a period of
detention in violation of FED. R. CX. P. 5(a) was
erroneously used as evidence against him. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed, holding that where defendant
orally confessed to a police officer to whom he had
voluntarily surrendered and signed a typed statement as soon as it could be prepared, the confession
was given during a period of lawful detention; and
even if the subsequent delay in presenting defendant to a committing magistrate was an unlawful
detention, this illegality did not operate retroactively to render inadmissible the typed statement
which had been voluntarily given during a period
of lawful detention.
Confessions-United States ex rel. Everett v.
Murphy, 329 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1964). Petitioner
was sentenced to life imprisonment upon conviction for felony murder by a New York State
court. After having exhausted his state remedies,
petitioner applied for writ of habeas corpus to the
United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York. On appeal from the district
court's summary denial of the writ, petitioner contended that his state conviction was obtained
through use of an involuntary confession and thus
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process of law. The- Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed and remanded with in-

structions to issue the writ and torelease petitioner
unless he be retried within a reasonable time, holding that where petitioner's confession was made
after he was illegally arrested, held incommunicado
for about 7 hours, questioned without benefit of
counsel and without being informed of his right to
counsel and to remain silent, and was falsely told
that the robbery victim was not seriously hurt and
that a detective would "help" petitioner if he confessed, the confession was not voluntary; and since
the confession was used as evidence against petitioner, his state conviction was obtained in violation of due process, and habeas corpus must issue.
Confessions-United States v. McDevitt, 328
F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1964). Defendant was convicted
of embezzling from a federal bank. On appeal, defendant contended that an inadmissible confession
was used as evidence against him. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that
where defendant's confession was voluntary, the
fact that it was made following a polygraph test
did not render the confession inadmissible. The
Court noted that the Government did not introduce evidence of the fact that defendant submitted
to a polygraph test or the results of the test.
Confessions-Williams v. United States, 328 F.2d
669 (5th Cir. 1964). Defendants were convicted of
robbing a post office. On appeal, defendants contended that evidence of their oral confessions
should have been suppressed. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that a written confession signed by defendants
and given to a postal inspector in California was
properly suppressed by the district court, since it
was induced by the inspector's promises that he
would try to get state court charges against defendants dismissed; and that evidence of defendants' subsequent oral confessions to a different
postal inspector in Texas were erroneously admitted and should have been suppressed, since the
Government failed to show that the operative
force of the California inducement had come to an
end before the Texas confessions were made, and,
most importantly, because at the time defendants
made the oral confessions in Texas they had
already signed a written confession which they
thought could and would be used against them. The
court noted that, before accepting further incriminating statements from defendants, the Government bore the burden of informing them that the
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original written confession would not be used
against them.
Confessions-Holland v. Gladden, 226 F. Supp.
654 (D. Ore. 1963). See Due Process of Law,
infra.
Confessions-United States v. Curry, 227 F.
Supp. 773 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). During trial for
federal offenses, defendant objected to the Government's offer in evidence of certain inculpatory
statements made by him, contending that they
were illegally obtained. The District Court for the
Eastern District of New York sustained the objection and suppressed the use of all statements
complained of, holding that defendant's statement
of Feb. 13, 1962, was illegally obtained because, although defendant was informed of his right to
counsel, he stated he knew none and was then
interrogated without being afforded the assistance
of counsel, and because the interrogation took
place during a detention illegal under FED. R.
Cpni. P. 5(a); and since the Feb. 13 statement was
illegally obtained, the subsequent inculpatory
statements were independently excludible as derivative of the original statement, in view of the
short interval of time from the making of the original statement and the absence of any intervention
by counsel. The court noted that since a complaint
against defendant had been made and a warrant
for his arrest had been issued at the time of defendant's interrogation, the primary purpose of the
interrogation was to obtain admissions from him
rather than to serve the immediate needs of police
administration. The court cited Killough v. United
States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962), abstracted at
54 J. CRm. L., C. & P.S. 491 (1963), as authority
for the derivative evidence point.
Confessions-State v. Traub, 196 A.2d 755
(Conn. 1963). Defendant was convicted of arson,
and the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
affirmed. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and ordered that the Supreme
Court of Errors judgment be vacated and the cause
remanded for further consideration in light of
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, abstracted at 54 J. CRat. L., C. & P.S. 189 (1963), and
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, abstracted at 54
3. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 488 (1963), both decided
after that judgment was rendered. On remand, defendant contended that his confessions, both
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verbal and in the form of reenactments of the
crime charged, made during his illegal detention
following an unlawful arrest, were improperly admitted against him. Assuming arguendo that defendant's arrest and detention were illegal, the
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed,
holding that the requirement of Wong Sun is that
a confession made during an illegal detention cannot be admitted unless and until the State proves
both that the confession was voluntary and that it
was not caused by, or the fruit of, the illegality; that
this second essential factor is not established unless
the State proves that the illegality was not an
"operative factor" in bringing about theconfession;
that the State's failure to prove the absence of this
causative factor will render an otherwise voluntary
confession inadmissible; but that, in the instant
case, defendant's confessions, including his reenactments, were voluntary and the assumed
illegal police conduct was not an operative factor
in bringing about any of them.
Confessions-State v. Ely, 390 P.2d 348 (Ore.
1964). Defendant, a school teacher, was convicted
of contributing to the delinquency of a child. On
appeal, defendant contended that the trial court
erroneously received in evidence a signed confession
given by defendant to private individuals (his
school principal, the local school superintendent,
and the father of the child), since the confession
was induced by their promises of immunity from
prosecution. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed and remanded, holding that a correct interpretation of Oregon and federal confession cases
required the exclusion of an involuntary confession
whether made to law enforcement officers or to
private persons; that under Oregon law a confession is initially deemed involuntary, and the State
has the burden of showing that it was voluntarily
made; that where defendant offered no evidence as
to the voluntariness of his confession and the
State's evidence on that issue tended to prove that
defendant agreed to sign the confession when confronted with charges of child molestation and upon
being told by his employers and the parents of the
child that his confession would be used to keep him
from teaching again but that they planned no
criminal prosecution, the State's evidence would
support a finding that the confession was induced
by an express or implied promise of immunity from
prosecution; and consequently, the State failed to
bear its burden of making out a prima facie case of
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voluntariness, and the trial court's admission of
defendant's confession in evidence was error.
Confessions-Cmnmonwealth v. Negri, 198 A.2d
595 (Pa. 1964). See Right to Counsel, infra.
Conspiracy-United States v. Horton, 328 F.2d
132 (3d Cir. 1964). See Search and Seizure,
infra.
Derivative Evidence-Hall v. State, 196 A.2d 874
(Md. 1964). Defendant was convicted of robbery
with a deadly weapon. On appeal, defendant contended that fingerprints admitted as evidence
against him were obtained while he was being unlawfully detained following his illegal arrest. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed, holding
that since incriminating statements, if voluntary,
are admissible as affirmative evidence although
made while the accused is in illegal custody, such
statements certainly could also be used by the
State as a rational basis for the issuance of an
arrest warrant; that therefore, even though the
arrest warrant supporting the contested arrest was
predicated on statements made by defendant
during an illegal detention, the warrant was valid,
since defendant's admissions were voluntary; and
consequently, since defendant was lawfully in
custody pursuant to the valid arrest warrant at the
time his fingerprints were taken, the fingerprints
were properly admitted in evidence against him.
Double Jeopardy-Beck v. State, 388 P.2d 336
(Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1963). Defendant was
convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in
overruling his motion for discharge on ground of
former jeopardy. Noting that the question whether
the jury was "unnecessarily discharged" was apparently of first impression in Oklahoma, the Court
of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed, holding
that where at defendant's former trial for the same
offense one juror informed the court, after the jury
was impaneled and sworn and one witness had
testified, that because of her friendship with defendant's mother the juror felt she could not conscientiously render a fair and impartial verdict, it
was necessary to excuse her from the jury; that
since defendant refused to agree to continue the
trial with eleven jurors, the trial court's declaration of mistrial over his objection was necessary;

and consequently, the second trial court's overruling of defendant's plea of former jeopardy was
correct.
Due Process of Law-Holland v. Gladden, 226
F. Supp. 654 (D. Ore. 1963). Petitioner was convicted of burglary and rape in an Oregon state
court. On petition for writ of habeas corpus regarding the rape conviction only, brought in the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon,
petitioner contended that the police coerced him
into signing a confession, and that the coercion
operated to vitiate his waiver of indictment and
plea of guilty as well. The district court dismissed
the application without prejudice, holding that
where petitioner was arrested at 11:00 p.m. on
Sept. 6, was questioned by up to 7 officers from the
time of his arrest until 4:00 a.m. Sept. 7, was never
informed of his right to remain silent or that his
statements could be used against him, was not permitted to call his wife, and was viewed at about
2:30 a.m. Sept. 7 through cell bars by several
assault victims and their husbands, petitioner's
confession, made shortly after 4:00 a.m. Sept. 7,
was coerced, since even if each of the above factors
was insufficient in itself to warrant a finding of
coercion, "together they paint a picture of police
practices repugnant to the requirements of due
process"; and even though the confession was not
used against petitioner, the method by which the
police extracted it tainted petitioner's plea and
conviction, entered the very morning the confession was made, particularly in light of the "unconscionable speed" with which petitioner was convicted; but since in addition to the 20 year rape
sentence petitioner was concurrently serving a valid
5 year sentence for burglary, he was lawfully imprisoned and his petition for habeas corpus was
premature.
Electronic Eavesdropping--Cullins v. Wainwright, 328 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964). Petitioner was
convicted of Florida lottery law violations, and he
exhausted his state remedies. The United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida
dismissed petitioner's application for writ of habeas
corpus and issued a certificate of probable cause to
permit appeal. On appeal, petitioner contended
that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress, since the search warrant under which
the evidence against him was seized had been
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issued on the basis of information obtained by
electronic eavesdropping in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that
where Florida police officers, with the consent of
the manager of the apartment building, removed a
grille from an air shaft in apartment 707, lowered a
microphone down the air shaft until it was opposite
a grille in apartment 607, and from apartment 707
operated recording and listening devices wired to
the microphone, the Fourth Amendment rights of
petitioner, whose conversations in apartment 607
were overheard by means of the electronic eavesdropping, were violated, inasmuch as the lowering
of the microphone into the sixth floor portion of the
ventilating shaft, which portion was wholly within
apartment 607, constituted an unlawful invasion of
a constitutionally protected area.
Entrapment-State v. Taylor, 375 S.W.2d 58
(Mo. 1964). Defendant was convicted of unlawfully
selling a narcotic drug. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in refusing to give
a proffered instruction submitting the defense of
entrapment to the jury. The Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed and remanded, holding that defendant was not precluded from invoking the defense of entrapment on the state's theory that that
defense was inconsistent with defendant's denial of
the charge, inasmuch as under the facts of the case
-wherein defendant admitted some participation
in the narcotics transaction but asserted that his
acts did not constitute a "sale"--the two defenses
were not so repugnant that proof of one necessarily
disproved the other; and consequently, since the
evidence raised a jury question of entrapment, the
trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as
to this available defense.
Equal Protection of the Laws--In re Trummer,36
Cal. Rptr. 281 (1964). See Narcotics, infra.
Evidence-Corroboration of Felon's Testimony
-Daniels v. State, 388 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1964). See
Witnesses-Testimony of Convicted Felon, infra.
Evidence-Hearsay-People v. Spriggs, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1964). Defendant was convicted by the
trial court sitting without a jury of possessing
heroin. On appeal, defendant contended that the
trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant to
elicit from a prosecution witness (a policeman)
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statements made to the witness by defendant's
companion to the effect that the companion rather
than defendant had possessed the heroin. The
Supreme Court of California, per Traynor, J., reversed, holding that where California's statutory
rules of evidence did not expressly require exclusion
of hearsay declarations against penal interest, the
court was free to determine, using the principle
that the purpose of all rules of evidence is to aid in
discovering the truth, whether or not such out-ofcourt declarations should be admissible hearsay
within CAL. CODE CIVIL PROC. §1845; that when
hearsay evidence is admitted, it is usually because
it has a high degree of trustworthiness; that inasmuch as hearsay declarations against pecuniary or
proprietary interest are admissible because they
are unlikely to be false, so also should a declaration
against penal interest such as that proffered by
defendant in the instant case be admissible, since
it is no less likely to be trustworthy; that hence the
trial court erred in excluding the proffered hearsay
declarations against defendant's companion's penal
interest; that whether or not the declarant was
available as a direct witness at defendant's trial
went to the weight to be given the declaration
rather than to its admissibility, and upon the event
of retrial, defense counsel should be allowed to
elicit the companion's declarations from the
prosecution witness regardless of whether the companion is available as a witness; and since the trial
court's erroneous ruling prevented it from considering admissible evidence tending to prove defendant's contention that his companion, not defendant, threw the heroin in question to the ground, the
error was prejudicial to him, and the judgment
must be reversed. The court noted that People v.
Hall, 30 Pac. 7 (Cal. 1892), was overruled insofar
as it was contrary to the instant case.
Evidence-Impeachment-People
v. Underwood, 37 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1964). See Admissions,
sup.ra.
Evidence-Prompt Complaint of Sex OffensesCommonwealth v. Bradford, 198 A.2d 412 (Pa.
Super. 1964). Defendant was convicted of statutory
rape, incestuous adultery, indecent assault, and
corrupting the morals of a minor, all for acts committed with his 13-year-old stepdaughter, Mildred,
over a period of about 3 years, and was sentenced
[apparently only] on the statutory rape charge. On
appeal, defendant contended that the trial court
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erroneously charged that Mildred's long delay in
reporting the crime could not be considered a factor
in weighing the credibility of her testimony. The
Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding
that while the theory that failure to make prompt
complaint constitutes some evidence that the
alleged act did not take place was reasonable and
correct as applied to an adult woman, that theory
had little if any evidential value on the question of
credibility where the victim is very young, inasmuch as embarrassment and fear of punishment
would render prompt complaint by a young girl unlikely; and consequently, the trial court's instruction that failure to make prompt complaint could
not be considered as detracting from Mildred's
credibility was not error.
Evidence-Psychiatric Evidence-State v. Green,
388 P.2d 362 (Mont. 1964). See Sex Offenses, infra.
Habeas Corpus-UnitedStates ex rel. Campbell v.
Rundle, 327 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1964). Petitioner
was convicted in a Pennsylvania state court in
1958 for abortion. After exhausting his state appellate remedies, petitioner applied to the federal
district court for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal
from denial of the writ, petitioner contended that
illegally seized evidence was admitted against him,
and that Mapp v. Ohio applied retroactively to
void the judgment of conviction. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that
since petitioner had not attempted collaterally to
attack the judgment by means of post-conviction
remedies other than appeal available to him at the
state level, he failed to exhaust his state remedies
and thus was not eligible for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254. By way of dictum
and "to the end that the [state] reviewing court
may be aware of what we think regarding the
merits of the controversy," the court pointed out
that the search complained of was illegal and that
Mapp should be retroactively applied to petitioner's case. Judge Kalodner, concurring in the
result, disapproved the majority's discussion of
issues not dispositive of the appeal.
[It should be noted that the Third Circuit's pronouncement in this case that Mapp is retroactive is
contrary to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
ruling on this issue in Commonwealth ex rel. Wilson
v. Rundle, 194 A.2d 143 (Pa. 1963), abstracted at

55 J. CRam. L., C. &P.S. 260 (1964).J

Habeas Corpus-Holland v. Gladden, 226 F.
Supp. 654 (D. Ore. 1963). See Due Process of Law,
Sup a.
Habeas Corpus-In re Fitts, 197 A.2d 808 (Vt.
1964). Upon petitioner's conviction for petty
larceny, the trial court suspended sentence and
placed her on probation. About 10 months later
the trial court found that petitioner violated the
terms of her probation and revoked the suspended
sentence, ordering petitioner to serve the original
sentence of 4 to 6 months. Petitioner's father as her
next friend instituted a petition for writ of habeas
corpus for petitioner's release, which was granted
by the county court on the ground that legal cause
had not been shown for petitioner's imprisonment.
On appeal by the State from the county court's
order, petitioner contended that her discharge on
writ of habeas corpus was not subject to an appeal
by the State. The Supreme Court of Vermont dismissed the State's appeal, holding that no Vermont
statute expressly authorized appeal by the State
from a habeas corpus proceeding; that in light of
Vermont statutes concerning habeas corpus which
indicate that habeas corpus proceedings were intended by the Legislature to be a quick, summary,
and final procedure for relief from illegal imprisonment, appeal by the State from an adverse habeas
corpus proceeding was not within the contemplation
of the general appellate statutes; and consequently,
the appealwasunauthorized and must be dismissed.
Homicide-People v. Monaco, 197 N.E.2d 532
(N.Y. 1964). Defendant was convicted of second
degree murder, and the appellate division affirmed.
On appeal, defendant contended that since there
was no evidence that he had a "design" to kill the
deceased, the evidence was insufficient to sustain
his conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York
modified the judgment and remitted defendant to
the trial court for imposition of sentence for first
degree manslaughter, holding that where the fatal
shot was fired by defendant's co-conspirator, an
intent to kill could not be attributed to defendant,
who was unarmed, merely because he and the coconspirator intended to engage in a street fight;
and in absence of specific proof that defendant
personally entertained a design to kill, the evidence
established only that defendant was guilty of first
degree manslaughter (for homicide without design
resulting from a planned assault).
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Homicide-Felony Murder-Peoplev. Mayfield, motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxi37 Cal. Rptr. 340 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defend- cants or drugs in violation of VA. CODE §22-98, and
ants were convicted of second degree murder. On on trial de novo by the Hustings Court was again
appeal, defendants contended that the evidence convicted. On writ of error, defendant contended
failed to show violation of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY that the trial court erred in overruling his motion
to dismiss, since the Chief Medical Examiner's
CODE §11501, prohibiting, inter alia, the administering of narcotics, and consequently, they were certificate showed that defendant's blood was taken
not criminally responsible for felonymurder on the on Dec. 8 while the evidence conclusively estabPeople's theory that decedent's death resulted lished that he was not arrested and did not give
from defendants' commission of a felony in viola- blood until Dec. 9. The Supreme Court of Appeals
tion of §11501. The California District Court of of Virginia reversed and dismissed the case, holding
that since the Examiner's certificate did not comply
Appeal reversed, holding that where defendants
and the deceased jointly purchased heroin for with VA. CODE §22-99.1(c) (the portion of the
their individual use, one defendant furnished some "implied consent" law prescribing procedures for
narcotics paraphernalia, and deceased died shortly the identification and testing of blood samples) for
after injecting himself with heroin, the evidence failure correctly to allege the date of receiving defailed to establish violation of §11501, inasmuch as fendant's blood sample, the analysis was inaddefendants did not "administer" a narcotic to de- missible; and defendant must be found not guilty,
ceased; and consequently, since it was not proved since §22-99.1(f) of that law provides in substance
that if analysis of the blood sample is inadmissible
that defendants committed a felony resulting in
the death of deceased, their convictions for second for failure strictly to comply with every provision
degree murder based on the felony murder theory of §22-99.1, the defendant's rights are deemed
must be reversed. The court noted several hypo- prejudiced and he shall be found not guilty of any
thetical situations which would yield unreasonable §22-98 offense. With regard to the City's claim
results if the People's theory of what constitutes that the date on the Examiner's certificate was a
"administering a narcotic" were adopted.
typographical error, the court noted that the City
failed to offer any evidence to prove this.
Homicide-Implied Malice-Stafford v. People,
Indictment and Information-United States v.
388 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1964). Defendant was convicted of first degree murder for killing his wife. Avila, 227 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Cal. 1963). See
On writ of error, defendant contended that since Search and Seizure, infra.
there was no evidence to support a finding of the
necessary element of malice, the trial court erred in
Indictment and Information-Moreno v. State,
submitting to the jury instructions as to first and 375 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1964). Desecond degree murder. The Supreme Court of fendant was convicted of aggravated assault. On
appeal, defendant [apparently] contended that the
Colorado reversed and remanded, holding that
nothing in the record tended to show express malice complaint was void for failure properly to allege
aforethought; that since death was not the natural the date of the offense charged. The Texas Court
consequence of a single blow inflicted with de- of Criminal Appeals reversed and ordered the
fendant's open hand upon the neck of his wife, a prosecution under the complaint dismissed, holdyoung adult in good health, the record also failed ing that since the allegation of an impossible date
to show proof of implied malice; and consequently, as the date of the commission of the offense renders
since there was no evidence at all of malice afore- an indictment, information, or complaint fatally
defective, the complaint against defendant, allegthought, either express or implied, the trial court
ing that the offense was committed on or about
erred in submitting to the jury instructions and
"the 7 day of March A.D. 19663," was fatally deforms of verdicts permitting them to find defend- fective.
ant guilty of any degree of murder.
Implied Consent Laws-Lutz v. City of Richinond, 135 S.E.2d 156 (Va. 1964). Defendant was
convicted by a city traffic court of operating a

Informers-Rugendorf v. United States, 84 Sup.
Ct. 825 (1964). Petitioner was convicted of knowingly receiving, concealing, and storing stolen furs
which had been transported in interstate com-

19641
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merce, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, petitioner contended that since probable cause did not exist for
issuance of the search warrant, his motion to suppress should have been granted, and that the trial
court should have granted his request to compel disclosure of the identity of the informant who supplied the information on the basis of which the
warrant was issued, inasmuch as petitioner needed
his name for purposes of arguing his motion to
suppress and in order to defend himself on the
merits. The United States Supreme Court, per
Clark, J., affirmed, holding that where the affidavit
included the informer's hearsay statements that he
saw furs in petitioner's basement and that he was
told they were stolen, and his hearsay declaration
describing the furs in detail, as well as the affiant
FBI agent's statements that his checking of
burglary report records revealed that only one
burglary involving furs had been reported in the
United States recently and that the furs stolen in
this Alabama burglary matched the description
and number that the informer said he saw in petitioner's basement, the search warrant was properly
issued, since the affidavit showed probable cause to
believe that stolen furs were in petitioner's basement; that since hearsay is sufficient to support an
affidavit for issuance of a search warrant and petitioner did not challenge the veracity of the hearsay
statements in the affidavit in any substantial respect, petitioner did not need to know the identity
of the informer for purposes of arguing his motion
to suppress, and withholding of this information
therefore did not compel suppression of the evidence; and since petitioner failed to raise below the
question whether he was entitled to disclosure of
the informer's identity for purposes of defending
himself at trial on the merits, the question was not
properly before the Court..Justices Warren, Brennan, and Goldberg concurred in Justice Douglas's
dissenting opinion,stating that the question of petitioner's need of the informer's identity for purposes of the merits had been raised below and
should be decided in petitioner's favor; but even
assuming arguendo that the issue was not raised
below, the Court should have considered it, since
refusal to disclose the informer's identity constituted plain error affecting petitoner's substantial
rights.
Informers-People v. Santiago, People v. Martin,
196 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y. 1964). See Arrest, Search
and Seizure, supra.

Insanity-Jmes v. United Slates, 327 F.2d 867
(D.C. Cir. 1963). Defendant was convicted of first
degree murder and assault with intent to kill, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. While defendant's petition for
certiorari was pending, Congress adopted new
legislation dealing with the punishment of murder
in the District of Columbia; while at the time of
defendant's conviction the death sentence was
mandatory upon conviction for first degree murder
[D.C. CODE §22-2404 (1951)], the amendment provided capital punishment for first degree murder
unless the jury shall unanimously recommend life
imprisonment, and permitted the trial court to
impose either the death penalty or life imprisonment if the jury is unable to agree as to punishment. [D.C. CODE §22-2404 (Supp. II, 1961).] As to
its retroactivity, the amendment stated that cases
tried prior to its effective date which are before the
court for sentencing or resentencing shall be
governed by the prior law, but that, in his sole discretion, the judge may consider circumstances in
mitigation and aggravation and shall sentence the
defendant to life imprisonment if, in his opinion,
the case justifies a sentence of life imprisonment.
Pursuant to the amendatory Act's proviso regarding the trial judge's discretionary power to reduce
sentence as to convictions rendered prior to passage
of the Act, defendant moved the district court to
reduce sentence and for a mental examination to
consider his present mental condition. The District
Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion for reduction of sentence without having
ordered a mental examination, but later appointed
three psychiatrists to examine defendant to ascertain whether he was sane for purposes of imposition
of the death penalty. The court did not subsequently modify its order denying the motion to
reduce sentence. On appeal, defendant contended
that the district court erred in failing to order a
complete mental examination before acting on his
motion to reduce sentence. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with
its opinion, holding that since the district judge
did not have before him the results of an extensive
and permissible mental examination as to defendant's present mental condition when he acted
on defendant's motion to reduce sentence, and the
motion for mental examination was supported by
an unrefuted affidavit by defendant's sister alleging
his post-conviction mental disorder, the order

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES

denying the motion for reduction of sentence must
be reversed and remanded, since even if the results
of an examination did not prove defendant to be
insane for purposes of precluding the imposition of
the death penalty on common law grounds [which
was apparently the only purpose for which the
district court appointed the psychiatrists to examine defendant], the amendatory Act conferred
on the district court the power to consider a lesser
degree of mental disorder in acting under the
proviso allowing him to reduce sentence in his
discretion.
Insanity-Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d
862 (Ky. 1963); Brumley v. Commonwealth, 375
S.W.2d 271 (Ky. 1964). The Court of Appeals of
Kentucky has replaced the traditional M'Naghten
plus irresistible impulse test of insanity with the
American Law Institute's rule, and has given the
new insanity test limited retroactive effect.
In Terry v. Commonwealth, the court reversed
and remanded defendant's murder conviction,
declaring that the insanity instruction given at
trial, though in accordance with the law as it then
existed, was erroneous, since the ALI test (MODEL
PENAL CODE §4.01) properly reflects the law. The
Court of Appeals instructed the trial court to
charge the jury as follows: "The law presumes
every man sane until the contrary is shown by the
evidence. Before the defendant can be excused on
the ground of insanity the jury must believe from
the evidence that at the time of the killing, the
defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect,
(a) was substantially unable to understand that
he was violating the law, or, (b) if he did understand it, was nevertheless substantially unable to
resist his impulse to commit the illegal act." The
court's main criticism of the discarded test was
that its traditional phraseology, by appearing to
define the law in terms of moral right and wrong
instead of legal criminality, materially impaired
the capacity of medical witnesses to lend real assistance to the court and jury in determining
defendant's mental state.
The new test of criminal responsibility was given
limited retroactive effect in Brumley v. Commonwealth. Although defendant Brumley was convicted
before the Terry decision, her appeal was pending
at the time Terry was decided. The Court of
Appeals reversed defendant's conviction resulting
from a trial at which the then correct but subsequently discarded pre-Terry insanity instruction
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was given, specifically stating that the change in
the insanity defense was prospective in application
except with regard to cases pending on appeal on
the date Terry was decided.
Joint Trials-Hoskins v. Commonwealth, 374
S.W.2d 839 (Ky. 1964). Defendants were convicted of being accessories before the fact to
murder. On appeal, defendants contended that the
trial court erred in overruling their motion for
separate trials, inasmuch as a substantial amount
of the evidence related to only one defendant and
not the other. Noting that the case was one of first
impression in the Commonwealth, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky affirmed, holding that, although Ky. R. CR. 9.16 operates as a mandatory
order upon the trial court to grant separate trials
if a defendant "is or will be prejudiced... by
joinder for trial," the court would follow the prevailing rule, namely, that the mere fact that evidence competent as to one defendant but incompetent as to the other may be introduced is not alone
sufficient to establish such prejudice as to require
the granting of separate trials. The court noted
that some factors-e.g., antagonistic defenses, or
evidence of one defendant incriminating to the
other-in addition to that present in the instant
case must be shown before Rule 9.16 could successfully be invoked.
Multiple Punishment-Grant v. State, 374
S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. 1964). Defendant, an attorney,
was convicted of contempt of court for suborning
perjury. On appeal, defendant contended that
since he advised four men as a group to commit
perjury, the trial court erred in sentencing him
cumulatively to four sentences of 10 days confinement and $50 fine each for his conduct with regard
to the four men. The Supreme Court of Tennessee
affirmed the judgment but modified the sentence
to require defendant to pay one $50 fine and serve
one 10 day jail sentence, holding that acts constituting a single transaction are susceptible of but
one criminal punishment; that defendant's actions
on one occasion in instructing four persons as a
group to perjure themselves constituted a single
transaction and a single contempt of court; and
consequently, only a single punishment could be
imposed. Noting that no case had been found
applying the above principle (prohibiting cumulative punishment for acts constituting a single
transaction) to a situation analogous to the instant
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case, the court held the principle controlling, since
the case at bar appeared to be "within the spirit"
of that rule.
Narcotics-In re Trummer, 36 Cal. Rptr. 281
(1964). Petitioner, on parole from the California
Rehabilitation Center, to which he had been civilly
committed as a narcotics addict under CAL. PEN.
COnE ch. 11, tit 7, part M, applied for habeas
corpus, contending that he should be released from
parole because he was no longer addicted and the
state may not detain a civilly committed addict
after he has been cured; that parole conditions
depriving him of his civil rights were unreasonable;
and that denial of jury trial on the issue of addiction violated petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection of the laws. The Supreme
Court of California denied the writ but ordered
that clause 12 be deleted from petitioner's parole
agreement, that petitioner's name be expunged
from any register of convicted narcotics addicts,
and that he be granted an opportunity to demand
jury trial on narcotic addiction as of the time of
commitment. The court held that since the purpose
of the civil commitment program was not only to
treat and "cure" addicts but also to rehabilitate
them, and since prior experience with similar programs demonstrates that lack of outpatient supervision results in an extremely high rate of relapse,
it was within the Legislature's power to require
that one committed as a narcotics addict remain
under supervision for a reasonable period sufficient
to give reasonable assurance against relapse, and
the court could not say that the three-year minimum period of parole established by the Legislature was unreasonable. The court further held that
since deprivation of civil rights was a form of
punishment, clause 12 of the petitioner's parole
agreement, purporting to deprive him of unlimited
exercise of certain of his civil rights, constituted
cruel and unusual punishment and thus violated
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under the doctrine of Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, abstracted at 53 J. CRm. L,. C. &
P.S. 492 (1962); that since, despite the uniformity
of the program's purpose and uniform treatment of
different classes of persons civilly committed as
narcotics addicts, the commitment procedures
afforded a jury trial on the issue of addiction to
certain arbitrary categories of persons while denying it to others, including petitioner, this aspect
of the program violated the equal protection clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment; but petitioner's
remedy was not to be discharged, but rather was
the right to demand that a jury try the issue of his
addiction as of when he was committed. The court
noted that since the time of petitioner's commitment, the Legislature had amended the statute
to provide the right to a jury trial on the issue of
addiction to all persons committed under the
program. Since CAL. PEN. CODE §6510 specifically
exempts civilly committed addicts from the necessity of registering "as a convicted narcotics addict"
under CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§11850 et.
seq., the court further ordered that petitioner's
name be stricken from any register maintained
under §11850.
Narcotics-Peoplev. Mayfield, 37 Cal. Rptr. 340

(Dist. Ct. App. 1964). See Homicide-Felony
Murder, supra.
Narcotics-People v. O'Neil, 37 Cal. Rptr. 734
(Dist. Ct. App. 1964). See Police Power, infra.
Parole-In re Trummer, 36 Cal. Rptr. 281
(1964). See Narcotics, supra.
Parole-State v. Mooneyham, 390 P.2d 215 (Kan.
1964). See Appeal by Defendant, supra.
Police Power-People v. O'Neil, 37 Cal. Rptr.
734 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defendant was convicted of driving a vehicle while addicted to the
use of a narcotic, in violation of CAL. VEncrL
CODE §23105. On appeal, defendant contended that
since his use of drugs was legal (by prescription)
and he was not under the influence of a narcotic
at the time in question, the statute did not apply
to him; and that the statute was unconstitutional
for violation of the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. The California District Court
of Appeal affirmed, holding that all that was required for conviction under §23105 was proof of
addiction and of driving a vehicle, since the Legislature had made no distinction between legal and
illegal addiction or between addiction and being
under the actual influence of a narcotic; that since
proof of driving a car as well as proof of addiction
was a necessary element of the offense, the statute
did not impose a criminal penalty for the mere
status of addiction; and consequently, in light of
the effects that use of narcotics can have upon a
person's reactions and judgment, the statute was a
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reasonable exercise of the police power necessary
for highway safety.
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contended that the sentence imposed was void
because he was denied the common law right of
allocution and the right to speak for himself
guaranteed by R.I. CONST. art. I, §10. The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island granted the petition, quashed the sentence, and returned the
records to respondent Superior Court with directions to impose sentence on the verdict as required
by law, holding that where, after the Assistant
Attorney General had made presentence recommendations, petitioner spoke three sentences and
then, when petitioner obviously had not concluded, the Assistant Attorney General interrupted
and the trial judge denied petitioner's request for
further opportunity to address the court, the trial
judge abused his discretion and denied petitioner
his constitutional liberty to speak in his own behalf,
including the right to explain his side of events
narrated by the Assistant Attorney General; and
since the Supreme Court could not assume that the
trial judge would not have been influenced in
imposing sentence by petitioner's statement, had
it been fully given, the sentence imposed was
illegal and void.

Prejudice by Indirection-Peoplev. Alversom, 36
Cal. Rptr. 479 (1964); Robinson v. State, 161 So.
2d 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Two recent
cases illustrate the concern of appellate courts for
prejudice suffered by a criminal defendant due to
a state official's conduct accomplishing by indirect
means what could under no circumstances lawfully
have been done directly.
In People v. Alverson, the prosecutor asked the
jury for acquittal of one of three co-defendants,
stating that he personally believed that defendant
to be innocent and did not want to convict an
innocent man. On appeal by one of the remaining
defendants, the California Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the prosecutor's statement necessarily
also told the jury that, by continuing to prosecute
the other two defendants, he personally believed
they were guilty; and since an express argument
that a prosecutor personally believes in a defendant's guilt is prejudicial misconduct requiring
reversal, the argument made in the instant case,
which conveyed the same information to the jury
indirectly, must carry the same legal effect.
Right to Confrontation-Booze v. State, 390 P.2d
In the Robinson case, the trial judge's remark 261 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1964). Defendant was
during cross-examination of a prosecution witness, convicted of second degree burglary. On appeal,
that the witness was "an honest, poor man" with defendant contended that he was deprived of his
an inferior education who was "doing the best he fundamental right to be confronted with the evican" to answer questions, was held by the Florida dence against him when two envelopes containing
District Court of Appeal to be prejudicial to de- insulation taken from defendant's person and from
fendant. The court reversed and remanded the the battered safe involved in the alleged burglary
judgment of conviction, holding that the trial were allowed to go to the jury room, where they
court's denial of motion for mistrial constituted were opened and compared. The Court of Criminal
reversible error, inasmuch as a trial judge's express Appeals of Oklahoma reversed and remanded,
comment upon a witness's veracity or character
holding that even though the unopened envelopes
constitutes prejudicial error, and the judge's were admitted as evidence and a chemist testified
comment in the instant case could have been as to the results of his comparisons of their coninterpreted by the jury as an indication of the tents, defendant's conviction must be reversed
judge's preference for the witness and belief in his
because of the comparison conducted by the jury
credibility.
not in open court, inasmuch as the out-of-court
comparison denied defendant his constitutional
Probation-People v. Dozie, People v. McClinton, and statutory rights to be confronted by and to
36 Cal. Rptr. 728 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). See defend against the prosecution's evidence; and
Statutory Construction-Dangerous or Deadly these rights were so fundamental that their denial
Weapon, infra.
compelled reversal and remand [apparently without proof that defendant suffered actual prejudice].
Right of Allocution-Robalewski v. Superior
Court, 197 A.2d 751 (R.I. 1964). Petitioner was
Right to Counsel-United States ex rel. Eterett
convicted for escape from the adult correctional
v. Murphy, 329 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1964). See Coninstitutions. On petition for certiorari, petitioner fessions, supra.
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Right to Counsel-United States v. Curry, 227 F.
Supp. 773 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). See Confessions,
supra.

... unreasonable road blocks should [not] be
placed in the path of police officials to help criminals escape detection and prosecution."

Right to Counsel-Fish v. State, 159 So. 2d
866 (Fla. 1964). Defendant was convicted of
several misdemeanors. On appeal from the trial
court's denial of his motion to vacate instituted
under FLA. CIU.PROC. R. No. 1, defendant contended that since he was indigent and did not waive
counsel, the judgments were void for failure of the
trial court to appoint counsel to represent him.
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed, holding
that since Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
abstracted at 54 J. CRna. L., C. & P.S. 193 (1963),
carried no clear mandate that indigents must be
provided counsel appointed by the state in misdemeanor as well as felony cases, the Florida legislative declaration [FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 63-409
(1963)] of state policy to provide the services of
public defenders only in felony cases, passed pursuant to Gideon, should not be overturned.
Right to Counsel-People v. Morris, 197 N.E.2d
433 (IIl. 1964). See Right to Cross-Examination,
infra.

Right to Counsel-Ex parte Hope, 374 S.W.2d
441 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1964). Petitioner was
sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment upon his state
felony conviction in 1935. In 1950 his application
to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for writ of
habeas corpus was denied. On further application
for writ of habeas corpus to the same court, petitioner contended that Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, abstracted at 54 J. Cnm. L., C. & P.S.
193 (1963), applied to void his conviction, which
was obtained following a trial at which the request
of petitioner, an indigent, for appointment of
counsel had been denied by the trial court. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the writ
and ordered that petitioner be discharged from
present custody and transferred to a county jail
to stand trial on the original indictment, holding
that since "the Supreme Court of the United States
is our appellate court in due process questions,...
in deference to their decision in Gideon, we have
no alternative but to grant the writ of habeas
corpus."

Right to Counsel-Commonwealth v. Negri, 198
A.2d 595 (Pa. 1964). Defendant was convicted of
murder. On appeal, defendant contended, inter
alia, that he was deprived of Sixth Amendment
rights when he was not given the services of counsel
upon arrest and before being questioned by the
police, and that the confession he made could not
be considered uncoerced in light of denial of
counsel. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed, holding that there was no legal or constitutional requirement that an arrestee be afforded
counsel before or during police interrogation; and
even assuming arguendo that defendant requested
counsel prior to interrogation and that this request
was refused, defendant's confession was not inadmissible on this basis, since denial of counsel in
and of itself does not constitute coercion, and the
record established that the confession was voluntary. The court noted, "The only function counsel
could provide at... [interrogation] would be to
instruct his client to keep his mouth shut.... [ihe
next logical step is to prohibit the police from even
questioning individuals suspected of or charged
with crime.... [Although] this Court has great
respect for the constitutional rights of an individual

Right to Counsel-Critical Stage in the Proceedings--Commonwealth ex rel. Maisenhelder v.
Rundle, 198 A.2d 565 (Pa. 1964); State v. Kirkland,
197 A.2d 876 (N.J. Super., App. Div. 1964);
State v. Guay, 196 A.2d 599 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1963). Three recent cases consider whether certain
pre-trial procedures are a "critical stage in the
proceedings" for the purpose of determining
whether a defendant has a right to be represented
by counsel at such proceedings under Fourteenth
Amendment due process.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Maisenhelder v. Rundle,
defendant without counsel pleaded guilty to a
charge of murder before a justice of the peace at a
preliminary hearing, and about 6 months later
entered a plea of guilty at arraignment where he
was represented by court-appointed counsel. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed denial of
defendant's petition for habeas corpus, holding
that the preliminary hearing was not a critical
stage in the proceedings at which defendant was
entitled to counsel, inasmuch as the purpose of a
preliminary hearing in Pennsylvania is to determine whether arrest and detention are lawful, and
because "it is not a trial in any sense of the word,"
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since the accused's guilt or innocence is not determined, nor is he required to speak or plead. The
court noted that defendant's preliminary hearing
plea was not used against him in subsequent
proceedings.
Defendant in Kirkland complained that failure
to have counsel at his preliminary examination was
prejudicial to him in that he lost the opportunity
to cross-examine the complaining witness, to make
a statement in his own behalf, and to argue that
there was no basis for the complaint. The Appellate
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed
denial of defendant's petition for habeas corpus,
holding that the preliminary examination was not
per se a critical stage of the proceedings, since no
rights could be lost and no motions waived for
failure there to urge them; and that since under
New Jersey law failure to grant a defendant a preliminary hearing will not vitiate a conviction,
defendant suffered no prejudice for failure to have
counsel at the examination, inasmuch as he was no
worse off than he would have been had there been
no preliminary examination.
In State v. Guay, defendant sought to quash the
indictment on the ground that he had been denied
counsel at the grand jury proceeding concerned
with the crime for which he was indicted. The
Superior Court of Connecticut denied the motion,
holding that since at the time of the grand jury
proceeding defendant had not been accused of
crime, and in light of the fact that a grand jury is
merely an accusatorial body, the proceeding was
not a "critical stage of the proceedings" against
defendant at which he was entitled to counsel.
Right to Cross-Examination-People v. Scholl,
37 Cal. Rptr. 475 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defendant
was convicted of committing sexual offenses upon
an 8-year-old girl. On appeal from the trial court's
denial of a new trial, defendant contended that the
trial court erred in refusing to allow him fully to
cross-examine the child's mother. Noting that
"such cases as these are fraught with danger, since
the charge rests on the credibility of a child witness
against the defendant's denial," the California
District Court of Appeal reversed the order denying new trial, holding that defendant's attempted
inquiry on cross-examination of the child's mother
as to whether the mother had complained of advances made to her by various men should have
been allowed, because if the mother had an abnormal attitude toward or fear of sex, the inquiries
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she put to her daughter may have implanted into
the child's mind ideas and details which existed
only in the fears and fantasies of the mother, and
the proffered cross-examination was designed to
explore the possible existence of a morbid fear of
sex in the mother's mind; and since the trial court
erred in refusing to allow this line of cross-examination, defendant should be afforded a new trial,
particularly where there was no corroboration of
the child's testimony, her complaint to her mother
was belated, and her testimony was not without
inconsistencies.
Right to Cross-Examination-People v. Morris,
197 N.E.2d 433 (Ill. 1964). Defendants were convicted of armed robbery. On consolidated writs of
error, defendants contended that the trial court
abused its discretion and committed error by
unduly limiting inquiry as to the complaining witness's capacity to identify his assailants, and that
defendants were denied counsel at their preliminary
hearing in violation of due process. The Supreme
Court of Illinois reversed and remanded, holding
that since the principal issue in the case was identification of defendants, the trial court should have
permitted defense counsel fully to cross-examine
the complaining witness on the matter of his
sobriety at the time of the alleged robbery and
should also have permitted a co-defendant to
testify regarding that same issue, inasmuch as
when identification is in issue, "defense counsel
should be given wide latitude on cross-examination
in order that the intelligence of the witness, his
powers of discernment and his capacity to form a
correct judgment may be submitted to the jury
so it may have an opportunity for determining
the value of his testimony"; and since the trial
court refused to allow such inquiry, defendants
should receive a new trial. The court noted that
since a preliminary hearing in Illinois is not a
"critical stage" of the proceedings against a
criminal defendant, Fourteenth Amendment due
process does not require that a defendant be represented by counsel at such proceeding.
Right to a Fair Trial-State v. Green, 388 P.2d
362 (Mont. 1964). See Sex Offenses, infra.
Right to Free Transcript-State ex rel. Legg v.
Boles, 135 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va. 1964). After petitioner was convicted of attempted murder on his
plea of guilty, the State filed an information charg-
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ing him with two prior felony convictions. A jury
found petitioner guilty of the charges in the information, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment
on May 9, 1963. On July 15, 1963, the court
granted petitioner's application requesting for appellate purposes a free transcript of the record of
his trial upon the information, and ordered the
court reporter to furnish the transcript topetitioner
without cost.The reporter did not prepare the transcript until Jan. 27,1964, at which time the 4 month
statutory appeal period had expired. On application
for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner contended that
the trial court's failure effectively to grant his request for transcript precluded him fromprosecuting
an appeal and thus constituted a denial of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia discharged the writ,
declared the sentence of life imprisonment void,
and remanded petitioner to the Warden to serve
the sentence for the primary offense, holding that
under W. VA. CODE §51-7-1 the court reporter is
an officer of the court, and thus also acts for the
State; that therefore the reporter's refusal to
furnish petitioner with the transcript constituted
a denial of his Fourteenth Amendment rights;
and consequently, petitioner was entitled to relief
from the sentence which he could not appeal as a
consequence of this violation of his constitutional

rights.
Right to Speak on Own Behalf-Robalewski v.
Superior Court, 197 A.2d 751 (R.I. 1964). See
Right of Allocution, supra.
Scientific Evidence-Polygraph Tests-State v.
Freeland, 125 N.W.2d 825 (Iowa 1964). Defendant
was convicted of breaking and entering. On appeal,
defendant contended that evidence obtained as a
result of an unlawful detention and search was
admitted against him, and that the trial court
erred in overruling his motion to require the state
to give him or to arrange for him to take a lie
detector test. The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed,
holding that, even assuming arguendo that defendant was unlawfully detained because not
promptly brought before a committing magistrate
after arrest, the evidence complained of was admissible, inasmuch as it consisted of the fruits of
the crime found in defendant's possession incident
to his lawful arrest without a warrant; that because the polygraph test has not as yet attained
scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate

means of ascertaining truth or deception, resultof such tests are not admissible except upon stipus
lation of both parties; and since the state resisted
defendant's motion regarding taking a polygraph
test and did not stipulate that the results be admitted in evidence, the trial court properly overruled the motion for lack of authority to coerce the
state into such an agreement.
Search and Seizure-Rugendorfv. United Slates,
84 Sup. Ct. 825 (1964). See Informers, supra.
Search and Seizure-Stoner v. California, 84
Sup. Ct. 889 (1964). After petitioner was convicted
of armed robbery in a California state court, the
California District Court of Appeal affirmed, and
the Supreme Court of California denied further
review. On certiorari, petitioner contended that
unlawfully seized evidence was admitted against
him at the trial. The United States Supreme Court,
per Stewart, J., reversed, holding that a search
without a warrant is sustainable against constitutional attack only if brought within one of the exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a
search warrant; that (as conceded by the Government) the search without warrant of petitioner's
hotel room in California on Oct. 27 could not be
justified as incident to his arrest in Nevada on
Oct. 29, since the search was completely unrelated
to the arrest both as to time and place; that the
search of petitioner's hotel room could not be
justified on the ground that the hotel's night clerk
consented thereto in petitioner's absence, since
petitioner's constitutional right of privacy in his
hotel room could be waived only directly by him
or through an authorized agent, and nothing in the
record indicated that the police had any basis to
believe that the clerk had been authorized by
petitioner to permit the police to search his room;
that the search was therefore unlawful and the
evidence obtained by means of the search was improperly admitted; and since the unconstitutionally seized evidence might reasonably have
contributed to the conviction, petitioner's conviction must be reversed. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the majority opinion except as to the
disposition of the case, stating that in the interest
of proper federal-state relations the cause should
be remanded to the California District Court of
Appeal for determination of the question whether
admission of the illegally seized evidence was
merely harmless error.
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Search and Seizure-Cidlins v. Wainwright, 328
F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964). See Electronic Eavesdropping, supra.
Search and Seizure-Maridlo v. United States,
328 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1964). Defendant was convicted of conspiring to steal, convert, receive, and
conceal stolen Government property. On appeal,
defendant contended that the district court erroneously refused to grant his motion to suppress
evidence obtained in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. Noting that the district court
had properly suppressed evidence obtained in a
search of defendant's motel room, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that
while a transient occupant of a motel room has a
constitutionally protected right of privacy as to
the room itself, this right does not extend to adjacent motel surroundings, inasmuch as an element
of public or shared property exists in those places
which are outside the individual motel rooms; that
defendant therefore had no constitutional right of
privacy with regard to the brick pillars outside
his room on which his motel cabin rested; and
consequently, evidence seized from the top of one
of these pillars pursuant to a search without a
warrant under the cabin was properly admitted
against defendant. The court noted that while the
concept of "curtilage" is applicable to a homeowner, who has exclusive enjoyment of the area
surrounding and under his home, that concept had
no application to a transient tenant, whose right to
exclusive possession extends only to the interior
of his rented room.
Search and Seizure-United States ex rel.
Campbell v. Rundle, 327 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1964).
See Habeas Corpus, supra.
Search and Seizure-United States v. Horton,
328 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1964). Defendants were
convicted of interstate transportation of a girl
under the age of 18 for the purpose of prostitution,
and of conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. §2424, which
requires filing with the Commissioner of Immigration a statement concerning the harboring of an
alien woman for the purpose of prostitution. On
appeal defendant Edgar contended that his motion
for acquittal on the conspiracy count was erroneously denied, and that testimony of the prostitute
in question and of police officers should have been
excluded ab the products of an unreasonable search

[Vol. 55

of defendant Horton's apartment. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the conspiracy judgment but affirmed as to the substantive
count, holding that the district court should have
granted defendant's motion for acquittal on the
conspiracy count, inasmuch as there was no evidence of his association with a purpose to further
or accomplish the objective of the alleged conspiracy; that unless the officers' manner of gaining admittance to Horton's apartment was unlawful, testimony growing out of what they saw
was admissible, since their observation of what
was in open view did not constitute a search; that
where local police officers, who (on the basis of a
tip from an undisclosed source that the Horton
apartment was being used for prostitution) were
keeping Horton's apartment under surveillance
from outside the apartment building, questioned
one Weiss who said he had gone to the apartment
to pick up a suit, accompanied Weiss to the apartment around noon to verify his story, and, upon
Horton's opening of the door to her apartment,
observed scantily clad women and discovered the
prostitute in question, the officers' entry was
lawful, since their immediate purpose was not to
conduct a search but rather to check Weiss's
story, and because Horton voluntarily opened the
door to admit Weiss, who had identified himself to
her through the door, regardless of the fact that
Horton did not know that the officers were with
Weiss; and consequently, since the officers were
lawfully on the premises, their testimony concerning what they saw and the testimony of the transported prostitute who was discovered at that time
was properly admitted in evidence.
Search and Seizure-United States v. Avila, 227
F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Cal. 1963). Defendants, indicted
for income tax evasion, moved to dismiss three
counts of the indictment on the ground that those
counts resulted from the use of illegally seized
evidence or evidence procured through its use, all
of which had been suppressed by the district court
on defendants' pre-indictment motion in 1962.
The District Court for the Northern District of
California dismissed defendants' motion without
prejudice to their right to object at trial to admission of any evidence within the terms of the
1962 suppression order, holding that while evidence
discovered by specific leads obtained during an
illegal search or examination is tainted by the
initial illegality, evidence obtained through further
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independent investigation, although inspired by
suspicions stemming from the illegal discovery, is
not similarly tainted; that the Government thus
might conceivably be able to offer at trial admissible evidence of the alleged violations, inasmuch as information resulting from investigations
subsequent to and independent of the original unlawful investigation would be admissible even if
the later investigation were made because of
suspicions aroused by information discovered
during the illegal investigation; and since the
Government might produce competent evidence
at trial, defendants' motion must be denied in
accordance with the general rule against dismissal
of indictments for incompetency of evidence presented before the grand jury.
Search and Seizure-People v. Hodson, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defendant was
convicted of possession of marijuana in a trial
without a jury. On appeal, defendant contended
that the evidence used to convict him was the
product of an illegal search and seizure. The California District Court of Appeal reversed, holding
that the prosecution had the burden of showing
proper justification for the search and seizure,
since defendant made out a prima fade case of
illegality by establishing that the search was made
without a warrant; that where police officers who
lacked probable cause to arrest defendant or
search the occupants or location of his apartment
gained entry by tricking defendant into opening
the door under the guise that one officer was the
manager of the building, the officers could not
rely upon defendant's subsequent consent to search
the premises, inasmuch as the illegality of the
officers' entry vitiated defendant's apparent consent; and consequently, the search and seizure
were unreasonable, and evidence thus obtained
should have been suppressed.
Search and Seizure-Bellam v. State, 196 A.2d
891 (Md. 1964). Defendant was convicted on
numerous counts of breaking and entering. On
appeal from three of the convictions, defendant
contended that the evidence supporting these
convictions was obtained as the result of an unreasonable search and seizure. Noting that the
issue of the authority of one joint occupant to
waive another's constitutional rights had not been
extensively discussed in the Maryland cases, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed, holding

that defendant's wife freely and voluntarily consented to the search complained of; that the wife,
as joint occupant of the premises with defendant,
was entitled to give consent and to bind the absent
defendant in so doing; and consequently, the
search was not unreasonable and the evidence was
properly admitted. The court noted that one
spouse's authority to bind the other to a consensual
search stems from joint ownership rather than from
an implied agency relationship.
Search and Seizure-People v. Rainey, 197
N.E.2d 527 (N.Y. 1964). Defendant was convicted
of forgery and receiving stolen goods, and the
Appellate Division affirmed. On appeal by permission, defendant contended that the trial court
erred in denying his pretrial motion to vacate a
search warrant and to suppress evidence, and in
receiving as evidence over his objection material
seized pursuant to a defective search warrant. The
Court of Appeals of New York reversed and dismissed the indictment, holding that since the
search warrant described an entire building, one
part of which (for which probable cause was
shown) was occupied by defendant and another
part (for which probable cause was not shown)
by an innocent third party, the warrant was
patently constitutionally deficient for not "particularly describing the place to be searched." The
court noted that the innocent third party's failure
to complain about the search of her apartment was
immaterial, since the pertinent issue was whether
or not the warrant was constitutional at the time
of issuance.
Search and Seizure-Larkinsv. State,376 S.W.2d
459 (Tenn. 1964). Defendants were convicted
of burglary and grand larceny. On appeal, defendants contended that illegally seized evidence
was introduced against them at the trial. The
Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed and remanded, holding that where a search warrant
showed on its face that it was issued on Dec. 8,
1962, but was supported by an affidavit reciting
that the affiant received the information on Dec.
11, 1962, the search warrant was void, despite the
state's contention that the discrepancy was a
mere clerical error; that the search on Dec. 8 conducted pursuant to the void warrant was illegal;
that even if it would have been valid but for the
prior illegal search, a second search of the same
premises on Dec. 12, 1962, was also illegal, inas-
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much as it was a continuation of the prior search;
and consequently, since defendants' constitutional
rights were violated, their convictions must be
reversed and remanded even though the evidence
of guilt was strong.
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Sex Offenses-People v. Scholl, 37 Cal. Rptr.
475 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). See Right to CrossExamination, supra.

Sex Offenses-Stae v. Green, 388 P.2d 362
(Mont. 1964). Defendant was convicted of atSearch and Seizure-Robertson v. State, 375 tempting to commit a lewd and lascivious act upon
S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1964). Defendant a child and was sentenced to 50 years' imprisonwas convicted of robbery by assault. On appeal, ment as a third felony offender. On appeal, dedefendant contended that the trial court errone- fendant [apparently] contended that introduction
ously admitted, over his objection, evidence in evidence of medical and psychiatric testimony
resulting from an illegal search and seizure. Noting for the ostensible purpose of proving defendant's
that the case was one of first impression in the state of mind at the time the alleged act was comstate, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas mitted violated his constitutional right to a fair
reversed and remanded, holding that where de- trial, since this testimony in effect convinced the
fendant said, "Come on in," to police officers who jury to convict defendant for being a sexual deviate
told defendant they would like to talk to him, rather than for commission of the act for which he
defendant's statement constituted merely an invi- was on trial. The Supreme Court of Montana retation to the officers to enter the apartment to versed and remanded, holding that rather than
talk to him, and could not be construed as an establishing defendant's state of mind, the medical
invitation or consent to search; and consequently, and psychiatric testimony, which indicated that
evidence discovered pursuant to the officers' search defendant had a long history of incurable sexual
of defendant's apartment without a warrant was perversion and deviation, "transformed what had
illegally seized and should have been suppressed, theretofore been a criminal prosecution into a cominasmuch as the articles seized were not in open mitment proceeding"; that the testimony comview and defendant did not consent to a search.
plained of must have overwhelmed the jury into
convicting defendant not because of what he had
Sentencing-Jones v. United States, 327 F.2d done, but because of what they thought he might
867 (D.C. Cir. 1963). See Insanity, supra.
do; that in the final analysis, defendant was in
effect convicted for being a sexual deviate, alSentencing-People v. Kroeger, 37 Cal. Rptr. though Montana has neither a "sexual psycho593 (1964); People v. Arguello, 37 Cal. Rptr. 601 path" law for civil commitment of sexual deviates
(1964); People v. Terry, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964); nor any provision making it a criminal offense to be
People v. Quicke, 37 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1964); People a sexual deviate; and consequently, because dev. Hines, 37 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1964). The California fendant did not receive a fair trial on the issue
Supreme Court has recently reversed as to penalty whether he committed the specific act with which
in five cases on the ground that the jury was al- he wascharged, the judgment mustbe reversed and
lowed to consider incompetent material, such as remanded.
possibility of pardon, parole, or commutation, in
Sex Offenses--Commonwealth v. Bradford, 198
the penalty phase of a murder trial. The Court in
A.2d
412 (Pa. Super. 1964). See Evidenceeach instance cited People v. Morse, 36 Cal. Rptr.
201, abstracted at 55 J. Clir. L., C. & P.S. 262 Prompt Complaint of Sex Offenses, supra.
(1964), which established this principle in CaliStatutory Construction-Administering Narfornia, as authority for its holding.
cotics-People v. Mayfield, 37 Cal. Rptr. 340 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1964). See Homicide-Felony Murder,
Sentencing-Robalewski v. Superior Court, 197 supra.
A.2d 751 (R.I. 1964). See Right of Allocution,
supra.
Statutory Construction-Dangerous or Deadly
Sentencing-Grant v. State, 374 S.W.2d 391
(Tenn. 1964). See Multiple Punishment, supra.

Weapon-People v. Dozie, People v. McClinton, 36
Cal. Rptr. 728 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defendants
waived jury trial and were convicted of first degree
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robbery and vehicle theft. On appeal, defendants
contended that a defendant's fist could not constitute a "dangerous or deadly weapon" under CAL.
PEN. CODE §211a, for purposes of rendering an
otherwise second degree robbery, robbery in the
first degree. Noting that the question was one of
first impression in California, the California
District Court of Appeal modified the judgment by
reducing the offense to robbery in the second degree, directed the trial court to reconsider defendants' applications for probation, and affirmed
in all other respects, holding that since the statutory phrase "armed with a dangerous or deadly
weapon" contemplated the intrinsic character of
the instrumentality with which the offender is
armed, regardless of whether the weapon is used at
all and irrespective of the degree of force, if any,
actually inflicted, bare fists could not be considered
dangerous or deadly weapons within the statute,
inasmuch as fists are not inherently dangerous
weapons with which one may be "armed"; that in
absence of any question that defendants committed
robbery as defined by CAL.PEN. CODE §211, their
crime became second degree robbery, and the
judgment would be modified accordingly; and
since the trial court might act more favorably on
defendants' applications for probation in light of a
second rather than a first degree robbery conviction, the trial court would be directed to reconsider their applications.
Statutory Construction-Kidnapping-State v.
Tatreau, 126 N.W.2d 157 (Neb. 1964). Defendant
was convicted of imprisoning three children for the
purpose of extorting money from their father in
violation of NEB. REv. STAT. §28-417 (1943). On
appeal, defendant contended that his acts did not
constitute a crime, since the kidnapping statute
did not apply to imprisonment within the children's
place of abode. The Supreme Court of Nebraska
affirmed, holding that the second sentence of §28417, providing, in pertinent part, "Whoever shall
unlawfully... imprison any person for the purpose of extorting... from his or her relatives...
any money," did not require that the imprisonment
be at a place other than the victims' place of abode,
inasmuch as "imprisonment" depends upon unlawful confinement against one's will rather than
upon the place of confinement, and since the
Legislature obviously intended to include such conduct as defendant's within the scope of the statute.

Statutory Construction-Public Drunkenness-

State v. Painter,134 S.E.2d 638 (N.C. 1964). Defendant was convicted of being drunk in a public
place in violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-335. On
appeal, defendant contended that the trial court
erroneously charged the jury, in effect, that being
"drunk" within the statute was synonymous with
being "under the influence of intoxicating liquor"
in the contemplation of other statutes. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina ordered a new
trial, holding that "drunk" was synonymous with
"intoxicated" but not with "under the influence of
intoxicating liquor," since a person who is drunk or
intoxicated is necessarily under the influence, while
a person under the influence is not necessarily
drunk or intoxicated; that in order to obtain a conviction under §14-335, the State must prove that
defendant was drunk-not merely under the influence of intoxicating liquor-in a public place;
that one is drunk if he is so far under the influence
that his passions are visibly excited or his judgment materially impaired, or that his intelligence,
sense-perceptions, judgment, continuity of thought
or ideas, speech, and coordination of volition with
muscular action, or some of these faculties or
processes, are materially impaired; and since under
the charge given the jury could have found defendant guilty even if it did not find that he was
drunk according to the above definition, defendant
was prejudiced by the erroneous instruction and
was entitled to a new trial.
Theft-State v. Sabins, 127 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa
1964); Braswell v. State, 389 P.2d 998 (Okla. Ct.
Crim. App. 1964). Two recent cases deal with the
distinction between the crimes of larceny by trick
or fraud and obtaining property by false pretenses.
In both cases the pertinent statutes contain all the
elements of those offenses as they existed at common law.
In State v. Sabins, defendant was convicted under
the false pretenses statute, IowA CODE: ANN.
§713.1. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed,
holding that since defendant fraudulently obtained possession but never actually obtained title
to an automobile under the law governing transfer
of title to automobiles, he was not guilty of obtaining property by false pretenses for lack of one
essential element of that crime-transfer of title to
defendant of the property in question. The court
noted that the evidence would support a conviction
of larceny by trick under §709.1.

